Click here - to select or create a menu

Naval News

  • News
  • Event News
    • Indo Pacific 2022
    • Sea Air Space 2022
    • DIMDEX 2022
    • WDS 2022
    • DSEI 2021
    • MADEX 2021
  • Interviews
  • Videos
  • Advertising
  • About Us
  • Contact Us
Home» News»Hidden Threat To Navies: How Freely Available Satellite Imagery Can Track Radars
Euronaval 2022
Radar Satellite imagery Russian Navy November 2020
Click to enlarge. Radar interference of Sentinel-1 satellite images over the Barents Sea. This coincides with a series of Russian Navy missile tests. The same interference is generally not seen when the Russian Navy is not exercising in the area.

Hidden Threat To Navies: How Freely Available Satellite Imagery Can Track Radars

H I Sutton 09 Dec 2020

Russia’s latest warships are engaged in tests of a new hypersonic cruise missile. The tests are taking place in the icy waters of the Barents Sea, one of the remotest places on earth. They are under the cover of the long artic night, and beneath a thick layer of cloud. And yet they are being watched. And not just by NATO submarines (which of course cannot be confirmed).

OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) uses publicly available data to get insights into military capabilities. We are accustomed to the commercial satellite imagery used by map programs and Google Earth. And it is intuitive that those can sometimes be used to reveal military secrets. But they cannot see through cloud, or at night. For that, other less well known commercial satellites can be used. These ones, which use a technology called Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), cover areas which are hidden from the regular imagery satellites. In essence they use radar to see through cloud, and at night. The arctic winter is no protection from SAR satellites.

The main OSINT source is the pair of Sentinel-1 satellites. These are part of the European Radar Observatory for the Copernicus joint initiative of the European Commission (EC) and the European Space Agency (ESA). The data is freely available on the internet.

Sentinel-1 satellites have a weakness which can be turned into a strength. They can be temporarily blinded by other radar transmissions. It may obscure the picture, but it has an unintended benefit that it can be used to locate, and sometimes identify, the radar in question.

Radar interferences on the strategically important island of Hainan in the South China Sea. Composite image of data gathered over a period of time. The analysis was compiled by Twitter user d-atis who uses custom tools and techniques.

Top tier militaries have been using technologies like this for years. Their purpose designed satellites may be able to detect and categorize a range of radars. Sentinel-1 is limited by comparison. It only transmits at 5.4 GHz, with a 100 MHz bandwidth so only other radars transmitting at 5300-5500 MHz interfere with it. In other words, it only picks up radars which happen to be operating on similar frequencies to the satellite itself.

Like most information sources in OSINT, we shouldn’t focus on what it cannot do, but what it can. Even with its relatively limited sensor picture, it can reveal military secrets. And if the observers have strong technical skills, which some do, then it can be transformed into a rich intelligence picture. This is especially true when combined with other OSINT sources.

The technical tools developed by analysts include one called 5Ghz Interference Tracker developed by OSINT Editor. This overlays multiple Sentinel-1 images and uses algorithms to differentiate the signals. Among the things this makes possible is getting fixes on static radar sources.

A lot can be gleaned from the images. The width of the interferences and pulse repetition helps identify the system. Older radars, which are analog and tend to be more repetitive, can be easy to classify. You can even make out the way that they are rotating as the satellite passes by. More modern radars, which incorporate anti-jamming techniques, give off a more confusing pattern. This doesn’t always mean that they cannot be identified.

Older radars can be easier to fingerprint because they are more predictable. Sometimes weather radars or other civilian types can cause the interference so as always, context is everything. This radar’s pattern is very similar to one noted off Libya.

Fixed site radars can be located by cross-referencing multiple satellite passes. As a rule, the interferences form a band running straight across the image. So if there are two satellite passes, from different angles, the X where they cross marks the spot where the radar is. Coupled with high resolution commercial satellite imagery (such as Google Earth), the radar can be identified. Or at least narrowed down. Even if a radar cross-fix is not possible, the source can often still be determined by searching along the path of the interference.

Ships are harder to cross reference because they move. However, in some cases the type of warship can be determined. Typically the context, and other OSINT data, is used for the initial identification. Some of the warships which can be seen are among the latest and most capable in their respective navies.

It is not just in the Russian arctic where these techniques can be applied to gain open source intelligence on the naval situation. Warships off the Chinese coast, or off Libya, or land based radars overlooking waters are also under the spotlight.

Open source intelligence can pose a threat to naval operations of any nation. It is free available and, largely, easily analyzed. Anyone with an internet connection can potentially locate warships in operational settings. Radar satellite data is not the most intuitive, but it provides OSINT watchers with yet another tool to track navies. And no navy is immune from OSINT.

OSINT Radar Satellite 2020-12-09
Tags OSINT Radar Satellite
Facebook Twitter Stumble linkedin Pinterest More

Authors

Posted by : H I Sutton
H I Sutton writes about the secretive and under-reported submarines, seeking out unusual and interesting vessels and technologies involved in fighting beneath the waves. Submarines, capabilities, naval special forces underwater vehicles and the changing world of underwater warfare and seabed warfare. To do this he combines the latest Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) with the traditional art and science of defense analysis. He occasionally writes non-fiction books on these topics and draws analysis-based illustrations to bring the subject to life. In addition, H I Sutton is a naval history buff and data geek. His personal website about these topics is Covert Shores (www.hisutton.com)

Related Articles

Unseenlabs to Launch two more Satellites Dedicated to Ship Geolocation

Unseenlabs to Launch two more Satellites Dedicated to Ship Geolocation

Naval News Staff 31 Mar 2022
BRO-6 and BRO-7, the sixth and seventh satellites of Unseenlabs’ constellation dedicated to the geolocation of vessels at sea, will be launched to meet the needs of a growing demand for space-based RF.
Unseenlabs Launches Fifth Maritime Surveillance Satellite

Unseenlabs Launches Fifth Maritime Surveillance Satellite

Naval News Staff 14 Jan 2022
Unseenlabs, the European leader in satellite-based radio frequency (RF) geolocation of ships at sea, has successfully deployed BRO-5, the fifth satellite in its fleet.
Unseenlabs to Test New Laser Communication System for Satellites

Unseenlabs to Test New Laser Communication System for Satellites

Martin Manaranche 04 Dec 2021
Unseenlabs, the European leader in satellite-based radio frequency (RF) geolocation of ships at sea, has won a French MoD contract to experiment a new high-speed optical communication system for satellites.

Advertisement

Legal / Privacy Policy
About Us
Contact Us

Copyright © 2022 Naval News
All Rights Reserved