As the saying goes, Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery. The Russian military has copied Ukraine’s now famous ‘Maritime Drone’ and begun using it against Ukrainian targets.
At the same time, Ukraine’s own ability to deploy maritime drones looks to have been massively reduced. SpaceX has said that it will prevent Ukraine using its Starlink system for its drones.
The Black Sea appears to be becoming more Russian friendly again.
Russia Adapts To Pose New Threat
On Feb 10 a small maritime drone (USV – uncrewed surface vessel) passed through the humanitarian grain corridor to Odesa and rammed a bridge. The large explosion undoubtedly caused some damage to Zatoka bridge, although assessments are unclear at this point. The bridge, which crosses the estuary of the Dniester River, is an important road and rail link in southern Ukraine. It has been targeted before by Russian missiles but this latest attack ushers in a new phase.
The bridge is easily reachable from the Black Sea, which presented Russia with a new opportunity: Explosive laden drone boats.
The exact details of the Russian drone boat are subject to speculation. Neither side has shared specific details. However defense analysts can make some deductions and form hypothesis. What follows is the most likely.
Russia’s Version Of The Maritime Drone
The drone boat is like a simple construction appearing similar to a small speedboat. It is uncrewed and instead controlled by radio or satellite links. The bandwidth of the connection, how much data can flow, will shape how it can be used. If the data rate is high enough a video feed can be used. This would allow real-time targeting. At the other end of the spectrum, it may be pre-programmed with coordinates which would only allow it to hit unmoving targets. Both could work and have their pros and cons.
The explosive boat can be towed part of the way to its target by other small boats. The Russian Navy’s Raptor assault boats, themselves a copy of yet Swedish CB90 concept, could be used. These have sustained high performance, decent seakeeping, and a basic armament for self defense. They could also function as mother ships, controlling the drones during the attack.
A group of fast boats would set out from Sevastopol or other Russian bases and sail towards the Ukrainian controlled coast. One or more would be towing the explosive ‘maritime drones’. The drones would have to operate in the grain corridor set up to allow merchant ships to safely sail to/from Odesa.
Starlink: Ukraine’s Maritime Drone Problem
The announcement that SpaceX, a company founded by Elon Musk, will limit how Ukraine can use its Starlink satellite service is bad news for the countries’ military. The impact on frontline use is only slowly emerging, but it is clear that drone usage will be affected.
Ukraine’s innovative maritime drones have been used to attack the Russian Navy in Sevastopol. And on November 18 2022 one even reached Novorossiysk. These attacks did not sink any Russian warships but they did contribute to keeping their navy at bay. New harbor defenses were implemented and many fewer Russian ships ventured out.
The maritime drones were able to operate so effectively because they used Starlink. This provided low-latency high-resolution data connections which appear hard to the Russians to jam. Therefore the drones could be equipped with multi-channel optical devices. This gave their pilots, hundreds of miles away, comparatively excellent situational awareness.
Therefore the maritime drones could adapt their mission to hit targets of opportunity and moving targets. This means that as well as ships in harbors, ones operating in open water were at risk. And especially those near the Crimean coast which were safe from Ukraine’s Harpoon anti-ship missiles.
So the loss of Starlink will likely be a limiter on Ukraine’s maritime drone operations. It is unlikely that Ukraine will give up, but compromises and reengineering will have to take place. And they will likely be less versatile.
Consequently we may see Black Sea operations enter a new phase with bolder operations by Russia. On February 13 one or more Russian Improved-KILO Class submarines made a surface transit from Novorossiysk to Sevastopol, by implication to load with Kalibr cruise missiles for a future attack. This transit was risky, but with the threat of Ukrainian maritime drones diminished, less risky then before.
