Despite indications that Houthi missiles used in the Red Sea may lack sophistication, their potential to cause significant damage to warships cannot be underestimated. While unconfirmed, available information suggests that Houthi ballistic missiles are unguided, and their cruise missiles may not match the latest technology. However, they still pose a considerable threat, capable of neutralizing a warship if hitting critical areas. Hence, the primary principle remains: neutralize air threats before they approach dangerously close.
For Arleigh Burke Class Flight IIA destroyers, the Phalanx CIWS serves as the last line of defense against air threats. These destroyers boast an array of advanced defensive systems, including the SM-2MR Block III/IV with a range of 90 nautical miles, the SM-6 surface-to-air missile with a 200 nautical mile range, and the Raytheon RIM-162A/B ESSM Block I point defense missile system with a 30 nautical mile range. Additionally, the ships are armed with a 127 mm gun, effective up to 15 km against air targets.
In this instance, a natural query arises: why did the USS Gravely employ the Phalanx CIWS, typically reserved as the last line of defense, to engage the incoming missile?
A cheap solution for Red Sea operations?
The Phalanx CIWS, an automated weapon system specifically developed for close-range interceptions, serves as one of the last resort defensive measures a ship employs to thwart an incoming missile, activated when preceding layers of defense fall short in intercepting the threat.
In diverse environments and high-stakes situations, the Phalanx operates in various modes tailored to specific scenarios. In hot regions and under heightened stress, the system seamlessly transitions into AAW Auto mode, also known as standalone mode. In this autonomous state, it actively seeks and eliminates targets independently, prioritizing those directly targeting the ship. Interestingly, it refrains from engaging contacts that have passed the ship, deeming them non-threatening. This distinction underscores that the decision to intercept a missile appears less discretionary and more of an imperative necessity rather than a deliberate choice by the commanding officer.
Since the inception of Operation Prosperity Guardian in the Red Sea, there has been criticism surrounding the use of missiles worth several million dollars to intercept kamikaze drones and ballistic missiles launched by the Houthis.
However, it’s crucial to understand that, for commanders at sea, deliberating over the cost of defending their ship against a missile is not their primary concern. Their foremost priority is the survival of the ship. The financial aspect is a matter left for planners to grapple with. In essence, no matter how exorbitant the cost of a missile may be, it cannot outweigh the value of a billion-dollar destroyer. The true reckoning of cost occurs after ensuring the ship’s survival.
Yet, the ramifications of a low-tech missile hitting an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, considered as one of the most powerful warships globally, extend beyond monetary considerations. The loss of personnel and the dent in prestige are indescribable. Cost becomes a secondary concern, evaluated only after the ship’s survival is secured.
Why Phalanx CIWS?
The answer to this question remains obscure for the time being. Until the typically transparent US Navy states the matter, it seems difficult to get 100% accurate information.
As mentioned earlier, the decision to shoot down the missile with the Phalanx CIWS appears to be a necessity rather than choice. In this context, the question arises as to the possible penetration of the outer layers of the multi-layered air defense system and the subsequent interception at close range. Why did this happen?
One conceivable scenario is that the AN/SPY-1D radar failed to detect the incoming missile. However, given the USS Gravely’s successful engagements with around 10 missiles and drones, this seems unlikely. Furthermore, the presence of other sophisticated sensors in the area means that a comprehensive aerial image is constantly being created.
Another possible factor is personnel inattention. However, given the high level of risk in the area, it can be assumed that personnel are in a constant state of heightened readiness. Combat fatigue, while a problem over time, is mitigated by the ship’s automatic detection, tracking and warning systems, which provide important alerts.
Technical malfunctions are another possibility. Problems in the launch or firing systems could disrupt missile deployment. While a malfunction in the vertical launch systems could interfere with the launch of air defense missiles, these systems are usually designed with redundancy. In the event of an immediate failure, backup solutions are activated to ensure that deployment still takes place.
Conclusion
In conclusion, these insights provide a speculative analysis of the recent incident, and the definitive reason can only be clarified by official statements from the US Navy. Once the precise details emerge, a more accurate assessment can be made.
This incident took place in the Red Sea serves as a real-world testament to the efficiency of the Phalanx CIWS in a conflict environment. It underscores the paramount importance of layered air defense strategies and the proactive neutralization of threats at the farthest possible range. As naval security continues to evolve, the lessons drawn from such incidents become integral in refining and fortifying defense mechanisms for future challenges.
