The Australian government on February 20 released a long awaited response outlining intentions for modernisation and expansion of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) surface fleet. The announcement itself followed the original Defence Strategic Review (DSR) published in May 2023. The earlier DSR abstained to make recommendations resolving challenges for the Australian Navy. Instead the review left this decision at the discretion of government based on the results of an Independent Analysis of the RAN. Canberra received the report for this Independent Analysis on September 29, 2023.
Tier 2 as new effort to replace ANZAC-class
In essence government was seeking to resolve concerns over the recapitalisation of the eight strong ANZAC-class commissioned in the 1990s. The ANZAC-class, based on the original German TKMS MEKO 200-design, emerged in response to the RAN-need for an affordable multirole frigate produced in cooperation with New Zealand. The effort designated SEA 5000 Phase 1 materialising as the Hunter-class frigate was previously the intended successor to ANZAC. However the program has run into problems of affordability, complexity and timelines. Hunter started out as an effort for a more capable multirole replacement for the ANZAC-class. As it turned out, the program now mostly serves as a template of all the mistakes to avoid in this regard.
As a result Hunter together with the Hobart-class AAW-destroyers has now “mutated” into the “Tier 1”-segment of combatants for the future fleet mix. In line with this perception Canberra intends to cut Hunter short at six instead of nine hulls. A “lower end”- or “Tier 2”-design has emerged as new effort to come true on the requirement for an additional ANZAC-successor and growing the RAN surface fleet. The new Tier 2-effort must therefore make concessions in capability and delivery timeframes to meet this aspiration. Yet here is where things are, again, getting complicated with decisions announced by government in February this year.
Tier 2-roles and candidate designs
The specific Tier-2 direction the Australian government is now aiming for in response to the independent review is as following: RAN is to acquire 11 new general purpose combatants, based on the IR recommendation of building “at least seven, and optimally 11” hulls. Importantly acquisition is to materialise “rapidly”, combining an initial foreign build with subsequent local construction at Henderson, WA. The new design is “optimised for undersea warfare, to operate both independently and in conjunction with the Tier 1 ships to secure maritime trade routes, northern approaches and escort military assets.” As such the general concept is in line with an ANZAC-successor in basic tasking. Things are getting slightly more complicated however with the detailed capabilities considered “essential”. These include:
- Operation of a naval helicopter.
- Operation of towed array-sonar and lightweight torpedoes.
- A limited number of point- and self defence-systems for air defence.
- Maritime and land strike.
- Force protection.
Each of these points individually or even in combination of two or three aspects is uncontroversial. It is also a default configuration for many medium-sized combatants. Matters becomes more challenging when considering all five aspects combined. This is particularly relevant for the ASW-role in combination with maritime and land-strike. The Independent Analysis helpfully provided four foreign designs considered “exemplars to form the basis of a selection process for this new general purpose frigate” to indicate a way out of the Australian surface fleet dilemma. Unfortunately the list also prompts further questions regarding the perception of the implied “military off the shelf”-approach as highlighted by the need for quick construction, including overseas, and overall affordability. The four candidates as listed are:
- Meko A-200 (TKMS/Germany)
- Mogami 30FFM (MHI/Japan)
- Daegu FFX Batch II/III (HHI/Korea)
- ALFA3000 (Navantia/Spain)
The Japanese angle and the Mogami-class
Australian commentary in response to the document quickly homed in particularly on the Mogami-class. The instinct is understandable in light of an increased effort by Canberra and Tokyo enhancing their security relationship. This cooperation included signing of relevant documents for military and industrial cooperation. Such decisions also have historical precedent. Observers will remember well the controversial fast track-effort by former Prime Minister Tony Abbott. When in office, Abbott tried to realise his personal preference for Soryu-class submarines or an adaption of the design for the RAN, before succumbing to pressure for a wider-ranging tender for the related SEA 1000-program.
In this context Mogami as an advanced frigate design produced in numbers appears well set up to address the dilemma for the Australian surface fleet. A closer look however quickly reveals several substantial caveats with the ambitious Australian requirements vis a vis the Japanese design.
Mogami as designed and realised by MHI is an affordable ASW- and general patrol combatant of around 3,900 tons standard load and 5,500 tons full displacement. Japan originally intended to produce over 20 hulls replacing older destroyer escorts, or light frigates by modern standards. Mogami is a bespoke Japanese design integrating a wholly Japanese combat management system (CMS) controlling indigenous weapons and sensors. The American Mk 45 main gun and the SeaRAM missile CIWS are the only substantial foreign-sourced armament. Additionally the design is capable of accommodating a Mk 41 VLS for 16 cells. The first six hulls do not include the VLS, with retrofitting scheduled for a later date. Hulls seven and eight under construction now are to see integration of the VLS before commissioning as per latest planning.
Even once Mogami features a VLS, its primary mission as ASW-frigate as per current intention will not include integration of a VLS-launched SAM. JMSDF will instead move an enhanced air defence capability to the larger and more capable Mogami-successor currently known as “New FFM”. This decision leaves SeaRAM as the primary anti-air point defence armament of the design. How such a capability matches the Australian Tier 2-requirements outlined above remains to be seen. It certainly seems a step back from ANZAC, which are capable of using ESSM. Integrating further weapons beyond the Japanese Type 07 ASW-missile launched from the VLS, or substituting the fitted Type 17 AShM would evidently incur addition cost and effort.
Notably such wide-ranging integration of foreign weapons, sensors or a foreign CMS into an originally Japanese-spec design would also be a first for a Japanese military vendor as a product for export. The long-standing cooperation between Japan and the US on AEGIS does provide some precedent. However this effort also stands in contrast adapting foreign technology to Japanese requirements and included close bilateral cooperation now lasting several decades.
Wider questions and challenges for Tier 2
The case as outlined with Mogami is to some extend relevant for any of the foreign designs proposed to serve as template. The Korean Daegu Batch II/III FFG also feature mostly Korean-developed hardware. Similar to Mogami the main gun and CIWS are notable exceptions in this regard. If RAN was to receive a Daegu-based design, it logically would have to introduce wholly foreign subsystems and weapons into the RAN operational ecosystem. Alternatively, as with Mogami, integration of bespoke hardware will require additional time and funding for procurement. Observers will remember the catastrophic SEA 1180-effort merely trying to fit a bespoke main gun to the Arafura-class OPV to get an idea of the respective challenges. The Hunter-program is a more extreme example still and of course the original cause of the present conundrum.
TKMS and Navantia do have a proven track record integrating foreign-sourced hardware into their company designs. ANZAC itself is an older MEKO-200 adaptation after all. Even so their products are not ready to cut first steel as soon as Canberra provides funding either. For immediate construction RAN again would have to introduce wholly new types of weapons, sensors and combat systems. The service likely also would have to forego a range of specifications relevant to its operational standards. Of the two vendors TKMS has the longer and more comprehensive track record offering a number of family designs meeting particular requirements.
It is worth noting here that Canberra so far has not communicated more detailed requirements beyond the five part-role description. This includes choice of the sensor suite and CMS-fit, to say nothing of the specific armament.
As Naval News understands, fitting of a CEA Technologies-sourced radar may not be required. Other aspects remain fully opaque. When approached by Naval News, the Australian DoD would only confirm that work has commenced on the acquisition of the Tier-2 combatants, without clarifying the issues outlined here.
In this context the size of the listed combatants also varies notably. Displacement starts at 3,600 tons for Daegu, itself an enlarged Incheon-class evolution. The Meko A200 and ALFA3000 come in at around 3,800 tons full load. Mogami is a notable outlier at 5,500 tons full load. Different requirements for complement, endurance, damage control and installed equipment are all factors explaining this spread. Again, how the Australian Tier 2-requirement intends to reconcile such variation in size and resulting capability remains to be seen.
The government response to the Independent Review intended to provide a clear course addressing the Australian surface fleet dilemma in regards to speedy naval modernisation. As this analysis laid out however, the suggested way out appears to pose further substantial challenges for costs and schedule. As such it may not be well set up to resolve the current deadlock for the future Australian surface fleet.
