In the weeks following the August 5th incident that saw Chinese ships harass a Philippine resupply mission to BRP Sierra Madre on Ayungin Shoal, the ripples are still being felt. Philippine security officials have had some of the harshest responses to date in relation to the incident, with one PCG commodore declaring that all Filipinos who supported Chinese actions in the area were “traitors”:
The Philippines is also slated to conduct a second run to BRP Sierra Madre before the end of the month before the Marines onboard run out of supplies. Amid the response, the Philippines is looking into increasing its maritime capabilities with the creation of a militia unit.
A Philippine Maritime Militia?
As a result of the recent tensions over the incident, the need for enhancing Philippine maritime capabilities in the West Philippine Sea has been brought to light. During a press conference last week, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Romeo Brawner Jr. brought up a plan for a Philippine maritime militia that included both navy reservists and civilian fishermen. It should be noted that this is not a new concept, as a plan in 2020 called for a maritime militia force that would use existing militia organizations in the Philippines but in a maritime security role. According to Brawner, the current proposal is awaiting funds for vessels.
Some resistance to the plan has arisen, most noticeably from fishermen on Pag-asa Island in the WPS who did not want to be armed. Filipino fishermen have traditionally provided reports of Chinese harassment and other intelligence to the Philippine Navy and Coast Guard, but have never been organized into an armed militia. This contrasts the use of maritime militia forces by other South China Sea claimants, such as China and Vietnam.
However, some have advocated against the use of a maritime militia. Ray Powell, SeaLight Director at the Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation, voiced his concern to Naval News as these forces would mirror the forces that China employs against them.
“While I think it’s important for Manila to consider a wide range of innovative options to respond to these incidents, I don’t know that there’s a way for other countries to successfully mirror China’s tactics,”
Ray Powell, SeaLight Director at the Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation
Powell also highlighted the dangerous boundary these forces blur between civilian and military operations, stating “The militia works for China because it is structurally unconcerned with the dangers of blurring the lines between civil and military operations.” Similar worries were voiced with the 2020 plan, specifically regarding the Philippine militia’s ability to stay professional during encounters with foreign vessels.
Another concern brought up with the creation of a maritime militia is that funds and personnel would be diverted from the Philippine military’s modernization efforts. With the AFP set to receive offshore patrol vessels and long-range patrol aircraft, the country will soon have assets better suited for Maritime Domain Awareness and patrol missions than any militia force. The Philippine Coast Guard’s (PCG) fleet is also better suited, with trained personnel and larger ships.
Timely Japanese Maritime Security Assistance
On August 8th, Japan unveiled its latest round of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the Philippines. Within this package, a grant for a Satellite Data Communication System for the PCG was included. This Satelite Communication (SATCOM) System is to be installed on the agency’s Parola and Teresa Magbanua Multi-Role Response Vessels (MRRV), which make up the bulk of the PCG’s fleet. Japanese press releases on the SATCOM grant, which came three days after the BRP Sierra Madre resupply mission incident, stated the system “is expected to improve Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)” and hoped that “May this technology be useful, especially in the WPS.”
Collin Koh, a Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, explained to Naval News that Japan’s SATCOM grant allows the PCG to operate more efficiently in the vast distances of the SCS.
“Having SATCOM facilitates PCG’s long-range operations in the SCS, and therefore promotes its staying power besides the means of coordinating more effectively with shore HQ, and other nearby Philippine assets,” said Koh.
Communications are an important aspect of the Philippines’ new information strategy. Within the last year, Philippine forces have been releasing photos and detailed reports of encounters in the region. The defining moments of Japanese-built PCG vessels being harassed by China Coast Guard and Maritime Militia vessels are now well-known thanks to these information efforts, which also help to counter other narratives about the incidents. SATCOM further enhances this strategy as Manila will now have a better capability to communicate with its frontline white hulls in the WPS.
The MRRVs which will receive the SATCOM system also came from Japanese ODA in 2013 and 2020 respectively. Japan has been one of the key backers of the PCG by providing vessels, training, education, and other capacity-building measures since the 1990s. Upcoming Japanese projects for the PCG include a coast guard base at Subic Bay and further training initiatives. According to Koh, Tokyo’s assistance is part of a broader effort by Japan to counter Chinese coercion in the SCS.
“Japan’s objective is to promote rules-based order in safeguarding this global maritime commons which it deems critical for its energy security and trade. The ability to uphold rules-based order in the SCS, via promoting maritime security capacities of the concerned SE Asian parties, also has linkages with what happens in the ECS. Tokyo views equivalence between its situation concerning PRC use of coercion and lawfare at sea, and that in the SCS.”
Collin Koh, Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
In June, Kagaapay 2023, the first-ever trilateral coast guard exercise between the Philippines, U.S., and Japan, was held off Luzon. While the Philippines denied that the drills were related to incidents with China, they were held after a rash of close encounters between the two prior to the exercise. Foreign support for Manila as a result of these incidents has greatly increased. Support and assistance offers have come in from not only Japan and the U.S. but also from Australia, Canada, and India. joint patrol in the South China Sea is also set between the U.S. and the Philippines before the end of the year.
Koh expects Japan to deepen its security cooperation with the Philippines, the next step being “widened cooperation in the military-to-military arena,” particularly in the transfer of higher-end Japanese military equipment. He also expects Japan to cooperate with the U.S. and Australia to “help build Philippine defense and security capacities.”
Powell recommended that the Philippines should take the initiative in requesting further support to deter China, stating that “Now Manila needs to reach out to its U.S. ally and other security partners and turn that support into options that will really deter China.”
