The recent letter from the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis regarding the allocation of four Freedom-class LCS (Littoral Combat Ships) to Greece, within the framework of a large-scale equipment package that includes a plethora of systems to enhance or modernize all branches of the Hellenic Armed Forces, confirms in its entirety the longstanding rumors of Greece’s interest in acquiring LCS.
Numerous reports, statements from Greek public figures, defense journalists, and the leadership of the Hellenic Navy (HN) indicated that Greece was actively considering the acquisition of LCS following their retirement from the US Navy. Note that the US Navy plans to retire a large number of the vessels of the class years ahead of the expected end of their service lives, ships which are extremely young by any standards and cost billions to build.
The HN seeks to modernize its Fleet by 2032, either with second-hand ships either with modernization programs. The main goal is to replace the nine Elli-class (former Royal Netherlands Navy Kortenaer-class frigates) of which the older one is 45 yrs old while the youngest (but not modernized!), 40! Therefore the new frigate and corvette programs are the most crucial steps for the acquisition of modern major surface combatants. The second step is the capability upgrade of the four Hydra-class (MEKO 200HN) frigates.
A heavier variant of the LCS design, named initially MMSC and later on an even more improved configuration named Hellenic Future Frigate (HF2), was proposed by Lockheed Martin during the new Greek frιgate program (2019-2021) for the construction of four (4) new frigates. The design competed against Naval Group FDI HN, Damen SIGMA 11515HN, Babcock ARROWHEAD 140HN, Fincantieri FREMM IT-ASW, TKMS MEKO A200/A300 and Navantia F110. Eventually, the tender won the French Naval Group with the FDI HN (3+1 option vessels), the Kimon-class.
After the cut of the frigate program from 4 to 3+1, Greece announced a corvette program (3+1 vessels) where MMSC competed against Naval Group’s GOWIND, Fincantieri’s FCX30, Damen’s SIGMA 10514 and Babcock’s ARROWHEAD 140HN. The last two, together with the American design, were gradually kicked out from the ongoing negotiations. No decision has been made yet on which manufacturer will provide the new multi-role corvettes.
The third leg of the renewal program of major surface units of the Fleet is the acquisition of second-hand units. The only somehow positive development regarding that part was the signing of an LoI between Greece and the Netherlands on October 27, 2021 for the possible transfer of two modernised Karel Doorman (M)-class frigates (and six Alkmaar-class mine-countermeasures vessels) to the Hellenic Navy, but without any new development regarding that deal.
The American vessels will be transferred via the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s Office of International Acquisition’s Excess Defense Articles Program (EDA). Greece has also received four Island-class cutters and it is about to receive three (3) Protector-class coastal patrol boats, via the same program. The purpose of the EDA program is to transfer excess defense equipment to foreign governments or international organizations for the modernization of their forces. Excess defense articles provided to partner nation at a reduced price (based on the condition of the equipment) or as a grant. Partner nations pay for packing, crating, handling, and transportation (PCH&T), as well as refurbishment if applicable – EDA is “as is, where is”.
Hence, through this approach, U.S. allies gain access to quality resources for the modernization of their forces. The United States, by supporting its allies in strategically significant regions, not only safeguards its own interests but also cultivates diplomatic ties. Simultaneously, the U.S. reinforces its defense industry by securing contracts for the refurbishment or upgrading of the transferred materials.
The acquisition of LCS and associated challenges
Contemplating the potential acquisition of the 3,500-ton LCS by Greece, a naval design universally labeled as “a beautiful disaster”, “a total mess”, “little crappy ship”, “a scandal” and comparable aliases, by naval officers, experts, politicians, analysts, and journalists worldwide, due to the ships’ limited combat utility, high running costs, and design problems, raises numerous questions:
- Does the cost include the fixing of the combining gear issue or Greece will have to pay for it?
- Under which terms the ships will be delivered and how much money Greece will pay for the procurement of the ships?
- Which ships Greece will acquire? Those with the TRS-3D and RAM CIWS or those with the TRS-4D, SeaRAM, advanced electronic equipment and stability improvements? Or ships from both variants and how will this affect the logistical support of the ships?
- Will the weapon systems of the vessels (RAM/SeaRAM, 30mm RWS, Mk110, DLS, 24-cell HELLFIRE launcher) and other equipment on board remain or they will be removed upon transfer?
- How would the procurement of LCS impact a prospective shipbuilding program, such as a corvette program or EPC, considering that LCS are expected to serve for at least 30-40 years and will necessitate substantial funds for upgrades?
- How much will it cost to bring those ships into a configuration similar to the GOWIND or FCX30 corvettes which are designed from built as multi-mission ships? Note that Freedom class lacks any kind of AAW or ASW capability due to the absence of weapons for that purpose (SAM VLS, TTs) and sensors (FCR, MFR, HMS, MOAS, VDS). Can Greece afford that?
- How the ships will execute ASW roles when the US Navy tested the VDS and it didn’t work as it should, while the ship is considered “noisy as an aircraft carrier”?
- If the US Navy (and even the US Coast Guard), opted to divest itself of the problematic LCS class without identifying a suitable role, how does Greece plan to achieve the contrary?
- Which role will the LCS assume ? That of a frigate, a corvette or an armed offshore patrol vessel?
- Is the HN leadership openly embracing the deal with the LCS, or do they lean towards rejection, even in light of its political nature?
Nevertheless, public discussions present compelling arguments supporting this transfer, including:
- There are no alternative second-hand units in the market for rapidly reinforcing the ageing Greek Fleet and in low price.
- The antiquated and obsolete frigates of the Elli class require urgent replacement.
- The LCS require a very small crew, almost half of that of a frigate like the Elli class, so they may be the solution to the shortage prevailing in the HN, without though assuming the role of a frigate.
- Their modular design allows them to potentially integrate various systems to support their mission, enabling them to assume the role of a modern corvette at half the cost (thanks to the free transfer).
- These vessels are relatively new constructions equipped with modern technology, demonstrating significant potential.
- There are numerous problems in the Fleet (replacement of mine warfare vessels, support ships, frigates, patrol boats, and most importantly, submarines) but in general in the Hellenic Armed Forces, which cannot be resolved in the coming years as substantial billions are required for such endeavors. Therefore the LCS deal might be a stop-gap solution.
Nevertheless, there is no denying that these ships will demand a significant investment of funds and effort to attain the status of major surface combatants. Achieving the capability to operate independently, relying extensively on their armament and equipment, will necessitate substantial financial resources and extensive work. The integration of these ships into the Fleet is certainly a significant challenge for Greece. Naval News will monitor the progress of this issue and provide updates accordingly.
