Russia has spent the last 15 years steadily modernizing and rearming its navy. The work is intended to recover it from the post-Cold War low point of the 1990s, reaching new levels. The introduction of new classes of warship, though smaller than those they replace, is a significant leap in modernity. Meanwhile new submarines, particularly the nuclear-powered Severodvinsk (Yasen) class, are truly world class.
But the project now faces a major obstacle. The cracks are already showing, and Russia is unlikely to be able to maintain the modernization of its naval forces if the war continues.
The invasion of Ukraine has heated the Russian economy and created new political and financial challenges for the Kremlin. This is felt on the battlefield, and is also visible in the navy’s reconstruction. So while the future Russian navy may retain some high-end assets, particularly advanced submarines, its overall influence at sea is likely to diminish.
Russia’s Grand Plans
Russia has been building new warships and submarines since the mid 2000s, and accelerated in the late 2010s. The best of the Cold War vessels were selected for modernisation. At the same time numerous new classes were laid down and pioneering new weapons developed. Kalibr cruise missiles were rolled out to almost any vessel which could conceivably carry them, the next generation Zircon hypersonic missile was tested. For a time modernising the naval capabilities was a major priority, arguably more so than the air force or army.
Russia’s ambitious submarine building spree since the 2010s has resulted in some of the most formidable submarines in the world. Competently commanded, they present a top tier underwater threat to NATO navies, particularly in the Atlantic. While the Russian Army got a handful of the latest T-14 Armata main battle tanks, the Navy commissioned 12 nuclear-powered submarines.
But construction was always slow and it appears to be getting worse. Some of the problems date back before the invasion, but they aren’t made any better by it. Over recent decades Russia’s conventional submarines have fallen behind in technological terms.
The Lada-class has generally been seen as unsuccessful and production is limited. In its place, the Cold War legacy Kilo-class design remains in production. This has been kept afloat by export orders, and benefits from Russian cruise missiles, but in 2024 is at least a generation behind many of the boats it is competing with. In the meantime Chinese submarines have come from behind and leapfrogged it, not to mention the South Korean and Japanese designs.
Plans Put On Ice
The 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine has changed everything. Whatever is currently being invested in naval modernisation is a massive drain on resources which are urgently needed elsewhere. On land Russia is already struggling with supplies of some key equipment types, such as artillery, where attrition losses are difficult to replace. Experts forecast that this situation will become critical next year.
In the land war some of the shortfall is being made up by North Korean supplies. First munitions, then ballistic missiles, then thousands of troops. The latest development is that, given the limited capacity to manufacture new artillery pieces, Russia has acquired some ‘Koksan’ heavy guns from North Korea. This demonstrating the desperation in the Russian supply chain. These mammoth artillery pieces are a non-standard 170mm which may strain Russian logistics even further. All the same these North Korean weapons appear to be a welcome addition from the Russian perspective.
The first naval projects to suffer, at least visibly, have been the modernisation of large warships. Repairs and refit to two of the largest and most impressive warships in the Russian fleet are eating up vast sums. The aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov’s refit is years delayed. According to Open Source reporting many of her crew have been sent to the front lines in Ukraine.
And nuclear powered Kirov-class battle cruiser Admiral Nakhimov, one of the world’s largest cruisers, is also massively delayed. The ship has been effectively non-operational since 1999 and its triumphant return to service has been repeatedly promised since 2008.
Even the nuclear submarine force, traditionally the strongest and most invested part of the navy, is not immune. The ‘Poseidon’ nuclear torpedo carrying submarine Khabarovsk also appears years behind. The submarine was laid down ten years ago and has yet to emerge from the shed.
Outlook
The Russian Navy, particularly its nuclear submarines, remain a formidable force threat which is taken seriously by NATO navies. But the outlook is a return to the underinvestment and decay of the 1990s.
Efforts to get major warships back to sea, such as the carrier Admiral Kutzenov or battle cruiser Admiral Nakhimov, increasingly seem like a Pyrrhic victories. The sunk cost of these modernizations appear now to be a question of national pride more than increasing naval capabilities. There are reports in Russian State media that the Nakhimov will sail for the first time in around 25 years this month. But there is a significant caveat; it will sail without its nuclear reactors running. While there may be some practical value to these plans, they appear more for show. The Soviet practice of symbolic milestones just before year end is alive and well.
The Russian Navy’s modernization plans are now significantly curtailed. Russia may be hoping that the incoming government in Washington will push a favourable solution in Ukraine, but the damage to their their naval plans already appears too deep.