This week the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a groundbreaking report on the lessons and failures of the Cruiser Modernization program, building on the statements of U.S. Navy officials throughout the program’s history.
The Cruiser Modernization program was initiated as a result of the Navy’s intent to begin decommissioning the Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser fleet. The retirement of the first seven Ticonderoga-class cruisers was proposed in 2012. Congress rejected this proposal and provided funds to modernize the fleet of Ticonderoga-class cruisers, marking the start of the Cruiser Modernization program that would last nearly 15 years.
The process of Cruiser Modernization
After back-and-forth between the U.S. Navy and Congress regarding specifics of the Phased Modernization Plan submitted as part of the President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2015, the U.S. Navy adopted a “2-4-6” strategy. According to the GAO, this strategy consisted of the following:
“A total of 11 cruisers [modernized] over 10 years by inducting no more than 2 cruisers each year into modernization cycles, for up to 4 years in modernization, and with no more than 6 cruisers undergoing modernization at the same time.”
Government Accountability Report on the Cruiser Modernization program
The plan called for the reduction of ship crews from 350 to 45 in a ‘caretaker’ role while the cruisers had preservation work done. The ships were also inactivated but kept in commission. According to the GAO, both of these moves are unusual for U.S. Navy ships undergoing modernization or maintenance.
After 90 days of preparation and preservation work, modernization would begin, with one or two 180-day CNO maintenance periods and one 550-day CNO dry dock maintenance phase, where the main effort of modernization would occur. The entire modernization period would take place over five fiscal years.
According to the U.S. Navy, midway through the modernization period for each ship, the crew size would be reinstated to 350 to ensure a smooth transition back to full operational capacity.
The entire Cruiser Modernization plan proved to be a failure for the U.S. Navy.
The causes of failure
According to the GAO, the main point of failure in the Cruiser Modernization program was a lack of long-term planning and preparation for such a complex task. The program experienced over 9,000 contract changes, resulting in delays and scope creep that made modernization extremely difficult for contractors and U.S. Navy inspectors. Little to no preparation was done in the planning, and no alternatives were considered.
“The Navy did not develop key program planning and oversight tools and documents for the cruiser modernization effort, such as an acquisition strategy, independent cost estimate, risk management plan, baseline, and Navy program oversight meetings, according to Navy officials.”
Government Accountability Report on the Cruiser Modernization program
The original cost for the modernization of five Ticonderoga-class cruisers, the USS Cowpens, USS Vicksburg, USS Gettysburg, USS Chosin, and USS Cape St. George, was estimated at $2.44 billion. According to GAO findings, the cost of this estimate grew by 36%, or nearly $881 million.
Schedule delays also marred the program. Cruiser Modernization had a planned modernization period of four years, as part of the 2-4-6 plan, but actual modernization periods that stretched between 3 years to 5 years, with each ship unique in its needs for modernization and repair. Four ships brought into their modernization periods were never completed; USS Hué City, USS Anzio, USS Cowpens, and USS Vicksburg.
“The Navy has yet to identify the root causes of unplanned work or develop and codify root cause mitigation strategies to prevent poor planning from similarly affecting future surface ship modernization efforts.”
Government Accountability Report on the Cruiser Modernization program
The U.S. Navy spent nearly $4 billion to modernize three Ticonderoga-class cruisers, giving those cruisers a cumulative 10 years of service life extension to 2030. The most recent extension was announced by Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro in early November. Naval News detailed the final breakdown of the Ticonderoga-class cruiser fleet here.
Of that $4 billion total, $1.84 billion was spent on four cruisers that never returned to the fleet. If the U.S. Navy moved ahead with the completion of modernization of one of those four cruisers, the USS Cowpens, it would take at least $88 million and an additional three years of drydock work according to the Surface Ship Modernization Program Office.
But the U.S. Navy officials managing day-to-day work on USS Cowpens said otherwise according to the GAO. They had never quantified the work remaining.
Lessons Learned for DDG MOD 2.0
“GAO is making six recommendations, including that the Navy assess root causes of unplanned work, develop mitigation strategies, and codify these strategies in policy; and re-assess its overall approach to quality assurance to prevent similar issues in future surface ship modernization efforts.”
Government Accountability Report on the Cruiser Modernization program
The failure of the Cruiser Modernization program is recognized as a failure by Congress, the U.S. Navy, and the GAO. Risks of repetition are likely if the U.S. Navy does not recognize these failures and the causes behind them. In the GAO report, the U.S. Navy concurred with all six recommendations made and has showed consistent effort to ensure the failures do not repeat in the future.
Modernization programs like the Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer fleet’s (DDG Modernization 2.0) are being handled with more care. The U.S. Navy is taking incremental steps to learn the complexities and potential difficulties of the effort that could cost over $17 billion for 20 ships. Future modernizations for the amphibious fleet will also take these lessons into account.
“The DDG modernization effort is based off of lessons learned from the cruiser modernization effort. [The DDG] modernization effort is focused on a ‘Crawl, Walk, Run’ effort using four ships.”
Capt. Tim Moore, Program Manager, Destroyer Modernization 2.0 (DDG MOD 2.0), at Sea Air Space 2024
