The Eagle S is a tanker believed to be part of Russia's "shadow fleet," which evades Western oil sanctions imposed over the war in Ukraine.
By Frederik Van Lokeren
The Swedish Navy dispatched its submarine rescue vessel HMS Belos to assist the Finnish efforts in creating an in-depth situational picture of the damage to the underwater infrastructure in the Gulf of Finland.
On Christmas day, the tanker Eagle-S damaged the Eastlink power cable. Subsequent investigation found that the tanker created a dragging track on the seabed that is several kilometers long. The current investigation is run by the Finnish police though the Finnish Navy is providing assistance to the investigation with the mine countermeasures vessel Vahterpää and the oil spill response vessel Hylkee as well as providing divers.
HMS Belos is strengthening the ongoing investigation as the vessel has the capabilities required for deep diving and work. As such, it complements the current capabilities already in place and allow for a more thorough investigation.
Today (January 7) HMS Belos retrieved the missing anchor from the Eagle S, suspected of being used to intentionally damage subsea power and communications cables in the Gulf of Finland. Finnish authorities have taken possession of the anchor and the Finnish National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) will begin analysing it.
Rumors of Finnish blockade unfounded
The presence of several Finnish warships in the Gulf of Finland, as well as recent reports of additional sanctions against Russia’s shadow fleet have let people speculating that the Finnish Navy was setting up a blockade against ships going to and from Saint Petersburg. These rumors were contradicted by Commander of Gulf of Finland Coast Guard District stating that no blockade has been put in place. The large concentration of ships reported in the Gulf of Finland appear to be vessels waiting to enter the port of Saint Petersburg and are not being placed in a holding zone for inspection.
Shadow fleet
However, additional sanctions and enforcement actions have been announced in December against Russia’s shadow fleet. This is a fleet of older tankers and cargo vessels that are used by Russia to circumvent Western sanctions. These vessels export Russian oil to neutral or third parties such as Turkey and India and are also known for transferring oil to other vessels during ship-to-ship transfers on the high seas. They often operate without or with limited AIS signals, making tracking difficult. The shadow fleet is one of the main lifelines of the Russian economy since Western sanctions on Russian oil and gas were implemented. As the war in Ukraine progresses, more and more sanctions are placed on the shadow fleet itself.
Expansion of Western sanctions
On December 11, the European Union released its 15th sanction package against Russia. Part of this sanction package is the barring of 52 tankers associated with the shadow fleet from European ports. This new round of sanctions raises the total of sanctioned vessels banned from European ports to 79 tankers. Compared to the European Union, the United Kingdom imposes larger sanctions to this date with over 100 vessels of the shadow fleet sanctioned, including 93 tankers.
On December 16th, the leaders of the Joint Expeditionary Force met in Tallinn to discuss actions to be taken against Russia’s shadow fleet. The meeting was held under the Nordic-Baltic 8++ format and included the countries of Finland, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Germany, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. These countries represent the bordering countries of the Baltic and North Sea.
In their joint declaration, the Nordic-Baltic 8++ group announces that it will take further actions against Russia’s shadow fleet. Their goal is to deter and disrupt the operations of the shadow fleet, prevent illegal operations and raise Russia’s cost of evading Western sanctions. The method these countries have selected is inspecting the vessels of the shadow fleet and verify if they are complaint with insurance and environment standards. Inspections could take place in the English Channel, the Danish Straits, the Sound between Denmark and Sweden and the Gulf of Finland. These inspections will request proof of insurance in the form of the CLC certificate issued by the ships flag state. The CLC certificate stands for the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage.
Just what is supposed to happen if these vessels are not compliant remains unknown. Several options are available such as issuing fines or confining the vessel to anchorages and ports until they have taken the necessary actions to become compliant.
The fact that the Nordic-Baltic 8++ forum focusses on the insurance and environmental compliance aspect of the shadow fleet is not much of a surprise. Most of the ships used in the shadow fleet are old and prone to breakdown and accidents. The risk for an environmental disaster involving tankers of the shadow fleet in the Baltic and North Seas is realistic.
Lately there have been several incidents with Russian cargo vessels in short order. The sinking of Russia’s civilian cargo vessel Ursa Major, often used in transporting weapons between Russia and pro-Russian regimes, due to an explosion in the engine room is the most recent example. Prior to the sinking of the Ursa Major, two Russian oil tankers, the Volgoneft 212 and Volgoneft 239 sank in the Kerch Strait after being damaged in bad weather. This lead to an ecologic disaster with fuel pollution on beaches as far as Sevastopol. Another Russian civilian cargo vessel, the Sparta, suffered a mechanical breakdown off the coast of France while it was heading towards the Mediterranean.
While none of the above mentioned vessels are part of Russia’s shadow fleet, they nevertheless raise concern about the current technical and mechanical state of Russia’s vessels. Incidents like these suggest that Russia might be putting in less effort in the technical maintenance and inspection of its cargo vessels.
Increased drone activity in the Baltic Region
Russia has become very reliant on oil exports coming out of the Saint Petersburg area. The threat of Ukrainian USVs resulted in Russia reducing exports from its Black Sea ports, instead opting to make use Saint Petersburg which is located further away from the Ukrainian battlefield.
Even so, Saint Petersburg no longer appears to be a safe area for exporting fuel. On January 4th, Ukrainian drones successfully struck the area near the oil terminal of Ust-Luga in the Saint Petersburg region. The damage of the drone strike was not reported by Russian sources and Ukrainian sources did not specify the intended target. Regardless, with Ukraine being able to strike targets at Ust-Luga there is a real possibility that Ukraine will try to interdict this port and prevent Russia from exporting oil.
Drones were also observed over Koge port, south of Copenhagen on Friday January 3rd around 10:30PM. Initially 20 heavy drones were reported flying over the Koge Marina though this was later reduced to four drones being observed with the last one leaving the area around 01:16AM. The drones reportedly disappeared over sea at high speed. The area where the drones were observed is located next to the Koge Erhvervshavn which is frequently used for military activity. The most recent used of Koge Erhvervshavn for military reasons dates back to December 11th when the area was closed of between 4:00AM until 7:00PM.
So far, there is no identification of the drones over Koge Marine. Open Sources point out that the area is located under the take-off and landing corridor of Copenhagen airport. Other sources point out that the Russian sea going tug Sergey Balk was located in Danish waters. Analysis of her AIS signals reveals that the Russian tag has been loitering in the northern part of the Skagerak since January 1st.
Frederik Van Lokeren is a former Navy Lieutenant, having served for seven years in the Belgian Navy where he was trained in logistics and maritime intelligence. Afterwards he’s been active as a freelance maritime analyst, regularly writing about naval developments on a strategic and operational level. His main area of expertise is the Russian Navy of which he keeps track on his personal blog Russian Navy – News and Analysis though he also keeps track of European navies and maritime developments in the Indo-Pacific Region.
